Why accusations of Brazilian hypocrisy on climate are ill-judged  

Ana Yang is Director of the Environment and Society Centre at Chatham House. 

In recent months, Brazil has been portrayed by the media, activists and other commentators as either angel or devil.

On the one hand, the country that houses 60% of the Amazon rainforest and an enormous wealth of biodiversity is touted as a climate champion, progressive host of the next UN climate talks, the potential saviour of multilateralism.  

On the other, the fifth-largest and seventh-most populous country in the world is demonised as hypocritical for pursuing oil exploration and production, investing in agriculture as a key export industry, and – most recently – building a new road on the outskirts of the northeastern city of Belem, which will host the COP30 UN climate summit in November.  

As a Brazilian working and living in London, this is a deeply familiar and frustrating story of a developing nation that cannot be trusted to act in its own interests on climate change, nor in those of the world. It is a story that holds low- and middle-income countries to different standards from rich ones, and denies them the same rights and routes to development.  

Oil production supports development

Recent criticism of Brazil’s decision to join the oil producers club, OPEC+, and of President Lula’s support for a new oil project typify this gleeful tendency to attack pragmatic leadership and deny political complexity. Such criticism is not only condescending, but counterproductive and short-sighted.  

By joining OPEC+ Brazil – with only 4% of global oil production and less than 2% of global trade oil – gets to be part of the club of countries that dictates oil prices. Crude oil is Brazil’s main export commodity, with China its main customer. Joining OPEC+ is a geopolitical move by a middle power designed to support commercial interests and trade diversification.  

Of course, rapid decarbonisation is imperative if the world is to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as per the Paris Agreement. But just as other countries scramble to balance climate goals against other policy objectives, including the opportunities of investment in fossil fuels, or provision of infrastructure, so too should Brazil be able to determine its own path to net zero. 

Brazil, a country at the forefront of the climate crisis, whose wealth is concentrated in its abundant natural resources, knows full well the importance of a managed fossil-fuel phase-out. The climate transition and decarbonisation is owned at the highest political level. The country already generates over 90% of its electricity from renewable sources, and has per capita emissions well below the global average.  

But President Lula was also elected on a promise of addressing the deep inequality, poverty, hunger and other challenges affecting the Brazilian population. Oil production and exploration contribute to the national coffers and help pay for the national health service, anti-poverty initiatives, and climate adaptation actions.  

If we genuinely want to support and encourage progress, we cannot expect Brazil to forgo its biggest commodity overnight. Instead we need an approach which acknowledges that policy-making is a game of balancing competing demands.  

No one-size-fits-all path to decarbonisation

Indeed, the truth is that, with three quarters of its emissions coming from deforestation and agriculture, Brazil’s decarbonisation challenge lies less in oil production and more in land use. To effect an equitable and low-carbon transition, the country will need to move away from a deforestation-based agriculture production model, cut methane from cattle herds and reduce reliance on fertiliser.  

Its farmers – from large to micro producers – will need to shift to integrated land management approaches that enable the protection of nature. And the country will need to continue to expand renewable energy capabilities while ensuring benefits are shared with local communities, and invested in climate adaptation.  

As for the international community, supporting Brazil as COP30 host means being inclusive rather than prescriptive. It means engaging the COP30 Presidency on areas of mutual interest and bringing the private sector along. It means offering solutions for climate and nature finance, focusing on the link with inequality, and aligning net-zero target dates with Lula’s own plans. It also means rich countries keeping their promises on climate finance.  

There are so many expectations around Brazil’s presidency of COP30, some unrealistic. But there are clear opportunities to make progress on climate finance, on emissions reduction targets and on nature. With the right sort of engagement from the international community and the private sector, Brazil will be able to start delivering on its climate promises, setting an example for others to follow.   

At its best, COP30 could kick off a decade of action, where the economic opportunities of the energy transition are turned into reality, and the polarised narrative of growth vs. climate action is consigned to history.  

To realise this potential, Brazil needs constructive partners who understand that decarbonisation is not a one-size-fits all policy. In a context of heightened geopolitical instability and competing fiscal pressures, collaboration between coalitions of the willing, characterised by mutual respect, must be at the heart of climate action in 2025 and beyond.